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REGULATORS' RESPONSE TO THe CURRENT CRISIS AND 
THE UPCOMING REREGULATION OF FlNANClAL 
IvJARKETS: ONE RELUCTANT REGULATOR'S VIEW 
LUCA El'\RIQUEs· 
1. [NTRODUCTLON 
Jn this short Article, I sketch out a few thoughts on securities 
regulators' response to the financial crisis of 2007-09 and on the 
upcoming process of financial markets reregulation, from the 
unconu110n perspective of a moderately free markcl-leaning legal 
scholar who was appointed as cornmissioner of the Italian 
securities regulator just before the crisis erupted. 
First, 1 show how a financial crisis like the one we have recently 
experienced requires regulators to beco.me active and appear to be 
"doing something," no n1atter whether ''something'' will even help 
markets, given the extreme nature of tl1c circumstances. Second, 1 
ask whether such a knee-jerk, public relations-rninded kind of 
response is inevitable or whether better corporate governance and 
accountability arrangements could improve the way regulators 
work and react to crises. Finally, I reflect upon the upcoming wave 
of reregulation, highlighting its perils and the most likely mistakes 
to come, concluding that, leaving aside the necessary overhaul of 
bartking regulation, maintaining a pretence of doing something 
while actually innovating very little may in fact be the best course 
of action for policymakers who care a bout the effectiveness of 
financial market regulation in the long run. 
2. \tVHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH, ... EVERYONE GETS GOlNG 
Crises are a test for a1L A systen1ic crisis like the one of 2008 
has been a test for all institutions, both private and public. Among 
public institutions, the gravity of the situation pul those with the 
· University of Bologna, Emopean Corporate Governance Institute and 
Commiss.ione Nazionale per le Societa e Ia 13ors<J (''Consob"). Opinions are 
exclusively the author's and of course do not necessarily retlect those of Consob. l 
am grateful to Marcello Bianchi for helpful cornmenls on an earlier draft and to 
Matteo Gargantini for his excellent research ,1ssistnnce. 
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adequate ammunitions-i.e., central lx1nks and governments-a t 
the forefront. 
fn a severe financial crisis such as the current one, while 
(securities) regu lators can do little to change the course of events, 
they still cannot si1nply stay idle: they have to do so1nething, for at 
least two reasons. First as conventional wisdom has it, if there i s  a 
crisis, t'hen regulator s  must have previously failed to do their job 
by omitting to take action, whether regulatory or supervisory, that 
could have prevented it. Thus, furthe.r inaction, however justified 
in theory, is intolerable in the middle of a crisis. Second, in such a 
grave sitLtation, a diffused sense of urgency implies that everyone 
is expected to do his or her part to aver t the meltdown, and it 
would be embmr C� ssing for any institution to confess that there js 
nothing it c;:m do to help: doubts about whether such an 
ins titution is even necessary in normal times would spread, and a 
negative political spiral for that insbtution, similar to the negative 
n'lc'Hket spirals we have observed for investment and conu11ercial 
banks from Bear Stearns on, would ensue. 
Thus, in response to the 2007-08 crash, regulators had to act, 
regardless of how littl e control they had over the situation. Their 
reaction, in the form of broad, temporary bans on short sales under 
the leadership of the BrHish Financial Services Authority ("FSA") 
and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC''), was 
the most important contribution to crisis management that any 
securities regulators gave. 
Economists have plenty of data to analyze in order to evaluate. 
the bans' impact on the markets. Even if the empirical evidence 
tells us that the bans had no positive impact and that in facl they 
had a negative one, reducing liquidjty and increasing volatility as 
econonuc intuition would suggest, 1 there still would be a politicnl 
1 Some early studies are already showing this. See MATIHEW CLIFTON & 
MARK SNAPE, THE EFFECT OF 51-TORT-SELLING RESTRICTIONS ON LIQUfDITY: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE LONDON" STOCK EXCIIANGE 3 (London Stock Exchange 2008)1 
http:/ jwww.londonstockexchange.comjNR/rdonlyres/5EDD66EF-B589-4974-
95B1-73C51F1C9DFC/O/ShortsellingRestrictionsandMarketQualityDecember2008 
.pdf (showing that after the FSA's decision to ban short-selling the bid-ask spread 
for banned stocks increased significantly, while a decline was observed in depth, 
trades, volume and turnover); [AN W. MARSH & NORMAN NIHvlEl{, THE [MPACT OF 
SHoRr St\1 ES RESTTHCTJONS, 11 (2008) (independent study commissioned by the 
fntem<ltional Securities Lending Association, the Alternative Investment 
Management Association, and the London Investment Banking Association), 
http:/ j v ww .cass.ci tv .ac.uk/med ia/ stories/ reson rces/ the-i_m pact-of-short-sales 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/16
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justification for the ban. Given that doing nothing in the face of the 
crisis was r'IOt an option for political reasons, lhc decision to ban 
short sales, however disputable from a technical viewpoint, might 
well have been the best course of action for securities regulators to 
take: a ban on short sales like those devi ·ed by securities 
regulators around the globe is not only very 1!115.tf to sell to public 
opinion as something both intuitively right and sufficiently bold, 
but also hard to enforce in an interconnected world in which trade 
orders can come from any jurisdiction via chains of 
i.nlcrmediaries.2 And last but not least, the bc:�n was fel!lpomry. By 
enacting it, regulators effectively solved the trade-off between 
politica I expediency and the need to preserve well·f unctioning 
markets. Other alternatives would have been either ineffective (in 
terms of public opinion's perception, think, for inslt:�nce, about the 
idea of reviving the ''uptick rule," which sounds like a technicality) 
or even more disruptive (think about a resolution shutting down 
markets altogether, as the Russian federal agency for securities 
markets did twice in October 2008).3 
The crisis has brought to the surface something that is 
inevitably true of (securities) regulators in normal times as well: 
political expediency is always of great concern regarding their 
actions (and inactions), no matter how formally independent and 
well-reputed regulators are. Rather than a concern for political 
expediency, we can more neutrally call it a concern for their irnage 
-rcstrictions.pdf (showing that there is no strong evidem:e that sl,ort-selling 
restrictions changed stock behaviour either in the U.K. or in oU1er countrit's). 
2 In theory, one could counter that this justification only holds if we take the 
presence or a separate securities regulator as a given. With a single financial 
r�gulcltor in charge, there would be other measures it could take to "do 
something," rnaking a ban on short sates unnecessary. It is a fact, however, that 
the first regulator to ban short sales on financial stocks, il (ev.r hours before the 
U.S. SEC on lhe same day, was a single regulator: the U.K. FSA. 
3 The uptick rule provided that, with limited exceptions, a listed security 
might be sold short either at a price above the price at which lhe immediately 
preceding sale was effected (plus tick), or at the last sale price ii il is higher than 
the last different price (zero-plus tick). The rule was repealed by the SEC on July 
6, 2007. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation SHO and Rule lOa-
1, Release No. 34-55970, 17 C.F.R pts. 240, 242 (Jul. 3, 1007), avni/n/1/e at 
http:/ jwww.sec.gov /rules/final/2007/34-55970.pdf (defining the uplick and 
zero-plus lick rules). Since then, several voices have called for the rule to be 
restored: see, e.g., Charles R Schwab, Restore the Urtick Rule, Rrsfor�t Confidence, 
WALL ST.)., Dt'c. 9, 2008, at 17. On Russian regulators' decisions to shut down 
markets in October 2008, see, e.g., Charles Clover, et al., R11::sim7 Trodi11g l-in/led 
n{ir'r Plttnge, FIN. TlMES (London), Nov.13, 2008. at 33. 
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in c1 world dorninated by mass media. In fact, good financial 
regL!lators are those who are able to put substance over form. But 
good financial regulators also tend to be smart enough to 
understand that they should put image o,·cr substance, if they 
want to thrive. And that, in general, can cause problems. 
Concern about public opinion easily distorts the way regu!l1tors 
perform their functions; similarly, according to some, short­
terrnisrTl (an excessive concern for financial Bnalysts' qu.:1rtcrly 
evaluations of a company's prospects) can dislorl rnnnagerial 
choices. In the private sector, corporate governance rnechanisms­
whether the result of private ordering or of IC�wrnakers' efforts­
curb the effects of such distortions and of agency problems more 
gener-.llly. Much less e p1ored than with regard to corporations is 
the qul'Stion of what governance mechanisms can similarly ensure 
that governmental organizations' agents pursue their institutions' 
objectives or, in other words, cater to the inter sts of their 
principe1ls (the general public). SimiJarly, there is less debate on 
whether all steps have been taken by individual jurisdictions to 
have the best possible regulators' governance mechanisms in place. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to note that the two 
jurisdictions currentty hosting the largest financial markets have 
sulved financial (securities) regulators' governance problems very 
diffcrenlly. 
On one hand, the U.S. SEC is a paradigmatic exan1ple of a 
supervisory agency relying aln1ost exclusively on political control 
mechanisms. The four main formal governance mechanisms are: (1) 
appointment rights (jn the hands of the President and the Senate); 
(2) what is known in the venture capital literature as staged 
financing (the annual approval of the SECs budget by the U.S. 
Congress); (3) a public sector gate keeping function in the form of 
an audit by the Govenm1ent Accountability Office ("GAO"); and 
(4) transparency, in the form for instance of the general rules of the 
Sunshine Act under which the Com1nission's meetings arc open to 
the public unless secrecy is necessary to protect a general interest:' 
On the other hand, the U.K. FSA relies on political control 
mechanisms no more (and on paper less) than on internal 
governance n1echanisn1s, mimicking those commonly adopted by 
I /\n important nzfomwl feature of the SEC governance is the revolving door 
system: n·u1ny SEC employees htlve previously <1nd subsequently served in law 
firms or finilncic1l institutions, usually working at the SEC for just fl few yeMs. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/16
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publicly traded corporations.::; Not only is the FSA formally 
incorporated as a private company limited by guarantee but, 
according to law, it also has to comply with the generally accepted 
best governance practices (to the extent that these are consistent 
with the FSA's tetsks). A number of principles of the U.K. 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance are thus embodied in 
the law governing the FSA: for exan1ple, the n1ajority of the FSA 
board members are non-executive directors (often rnaintaining 
their previous employment) and the board has to set up internal 
con1mittees corresponding to audit and remuneration committees 
of listed corporations. l'vToreover, the roles of Chairman and CEO 
have to be split, and a lead non-executive director has to be 
appointed, while top management compensettion is performance­
related. 
Whether political accountability is a sufficient governance 
mechanism to ensure that supervisory agencies' agents perform 
their task well or whether governance mechanisms typical of 
publicly traded corporations are useful complements for the same 
purpose are questions that it is impossible to answer on a general 
basis. A well-functioning political arena can make the marginal 
contribution of corporate governance mechetnisms in the absence of 
market constraints absolutely trivial. 
On the other hand, in countries where politicians have a strong 
clout on formally independent regulators, governance mechanisms 
granting voice to constituencies such as industry, practitioners and 
consumer representatives can help avoid excessive regulation and 
hyper-sensitivity to public image concerns, at least in 
circumstances not as extreme as the ones we have experienced in 
the early Fall of 2008. 
3. REREGULATION: IS THERE A CHANCE TO AVOID THE USUAL 
MISTAKES? 
While taking measures to avoid the financial meltdown and to 
smooth the effects of the crisis, policymakers around the globe are 
already busy fixing what the crisis purportedly has shown to be 
5 In the following no specific attention will be paid on political control 
mechanisms. Suffice it to say here that the FSA is much more independent from 
political bodies in making its budget decisions and in levying fees from market 
participants than the U.S. SEC. A form of accountability towards the market 
exists, in the form of a prior consultation on the entity and distribution of fees 
among the various n1arket participants. 
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broken in (or shamefully absent from) financial markets 1aws. lf 
(among o thers) Enron and \NorldCom in lhe United States and 
A hold and Parma tal in the EU prompted a season of "do 
something" reforms, as Roberta Romano has argued,{, a crisis of 
such proportions vvill inevitably lead (and in fact is already 
leading) tu the san1c kind of regulatory clctivism. 
ll is eC\sy to predict that reregulali.on will lake (at least) four 
forms. First, fincmcial institutions that arc currently unregulated or 
very light ly regulated (hke hedge funds or rJting agencies) will 
become more heavily regulated. JnteresLingly, just like measures 
in lhe Sarbanes-Oxley Act, proposals for tighter regLtla tjo n of little 
regula lcd or unregulated players had c1lrcady been in place for a 
while before the crisis erupted, showing once again that crises are 
the most effective catalyst for increased regulation./ Second, the 
most obvious loopho les in financial regulation will be eliminated 
(like the use of SIVs to lmvcr capita] adequacy requirements). 
Third, an overall review of the existing rules will take place, as it is 
already apparent with regard to the architecture of financia 1 
supervision in the United States and of the Basel TI framework at 
the international level. Fourth, international coordination will 
intensify much more than in the 2000s round of post-scandal 
reforms, clue to the apparent global intercon.nectjon of the market 
players at the center of the crisis, which will possibly lead to a 
reduction in the scope of regulatory arbilrage and therefore in 
regulatory con1petition. 
There are a number of problems with reregu lating (:fiJlancia 1) 
tnarkets during, or in the aftermath ot a severe financial (and 
econom.ic) crisis. While such problems are well-known, it is 
perhaps not totally pointless to list some of them here. 
first of all, during or after a crisis, the costs stemming fron1 the 
new regulatory framework are overlooked, while the benefits are 
overestimated. :tvloreover, how can one overestimate the benefit of 
any given rule ii its proponents can argue that it has the potentia] 
to reduce, however little, the risk of another such crisis? Take 
systemic risk: how could one possibly oppose something as 
" See Roberta Romano, The Snrbnllcs-Oxley Act nud tfze Making of Quack 
Co,-pomte Govemnnce, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525-26 (2005) (describing the "peculiar 
disjuncture between the substantive corporate governance provisions of SOX and 
the �ourcc of Enron's failure''). 
7 /,f. al ]526 ("The failure of Enron, then, provided the occasion for 
implementation of corporate governance initintives that were already in the policy 
") .c;oup . .  
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intuitively good as a measure reducing systemic risk? Second, as 
many have noticed, after a crisis regulators act like generals of on 
army after losing a ,,var: they reorganize to vvin thc1t past war, 
\·vhich is a good recipe to be unprepared for the ne·d one.� Finally, 
one problem with reregulation is that it is politically insensible for 
policymakers to scrap previous rules tl1at have proven to be 
ineffective, inefficient, or obsolete, even while they introduce new 
rules that possibly tnckle the sc-nne problen1s as the old ones. 
Unless the new rules are just tormal substitutes of the previous 
rules, the latter will often stay despite their being (or having 
become) pointless. tn facl, in dccid ing whether to repeal rules, a 
policymaker wm anlicipate the possibility that, in case of repeal, 
after the next scandal or crisis someone might ex post argue that 
those rules would have helped detect the scandal or prevent the 
crisis, casting a highly negative light on thnl policymaker' s 
decision. Hence, there will be a strong bias in favor of preserving 
all rules in place. 
4. ''FACITE AMMUINA" AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION? 
Borrowing Gerard Hertig's words, the conclusion to one of my 
works published in this Journal was that, posl-Enron, in the area of 
corporate law, the European Community should have had the 
courage to do almost nothing.9 At the cost of sounding repetitive 
(and even more provocative), 1 argue here that this 
recommendation is m.ore generally valid in today's post-crisis 
world. Of course, regulations like the capital adequacy framework 
for banks -that have proved easily avoidable and/ or ineffective 
and/or lo have unintended consequences-will have to be 
reshaped. But in many areas, the best course of action will be to 
stay idle, not least for the very simple reason that 1narkets 
themselves are already self-correcting, and regulators are 
intensifying their action. Cultural change is already in place, as 
press reports on banks' attitudes show a trend towards tougher 
risk management and better policies on top executive 
8 See, e.g., JOHN G. FRANCIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULAliON 182 (1993) 
(comparing financial regulatory regimes to armies reorganizing to fight war they 
have just lost and predicting" a loss of confidence in the regulatory structure'' as 
the likely result). 
9 St'e Luca Enriqucs & Matteo Gatti, Tin• Unensy Ca�c fur ToJ'-DOWII Corr1orntc 
Law Hanilolliznlimt in the Europem1 Union, 27 U. PA . .f.lNT'L ECON. L. 939,998 (2006) 
(describing the context of Hertig's comment, and how il is very unrealistic to 
expect nothing to be doM). 
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compensation.111 Regulators' tendency to be tougher, e�bandoning 
previous light-tCluch approaches, is also evident. 1 1  
While theorelica11y defensible, the idea of doing al most nothing 
is, of course, a political non-starter. Something \-dll h.:we to be 
done- or e�t lee1st ·will hnve to appct?r to be done. Then, " viable, 
second-best strategy (and possibly one governments are adoptin g 
already ln somt> degree, especially so long as they keep acting 
primarily nl the international le,·el) could be what in l capolitan 
di.:1lccl is h.novvn iiS ''fare ammuina:" much like sailors of the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilics' Navy back itt the Nineteenlh century 
did when the Highest Authorities of the Kingdom visited their 
�hips/:!. regulators should make a lot of noise Clnd show a lot of 
activisrn, all the while producing very little change. Of course , it 
would be hard to fool cognoscenti of financial markets regulation 
and practitioners, but the latter would not protest and lhe former 
would have too little an audience once the financial crisis is over. 
A possible counterargument may be that if nothjng "rec:.1!'' is 
accomplished and instead regulation is conducted in what is 
known in Italian as the "gattopardesco" way,l1 then a time will 
come when morkel ployers (and once again cap tive regulators) will 
have forgotten p revious excesses and will again start taking 
excessive risk and i n.flating bubbles. Because those will be 
prosperous tin1es, policymakers will have absolutely no clout to 
curb those excesses and to deflate those bubbles, much like tlley 
111 Sec, c.�., Louise Story, 011 INn II Straet, a Bou us Sen son of Uncertainty, ]NT' L 
HERr\LD TRJB., Dec. 10, 2008, <1t n (describing how Wall Streel banks were to cut 
annual bonuses); Kalrin Bennhold, Report Pi11poi11ts Fnulls al Societe Cent!ralt', INT'L 
I IER�\LD TRI!�., May 24, :wos (reporting that SociQte Gent:!rale was pbnning to 
cor·recl ils risk control system after huge unexpected losses emerg<>d as a 
consequence or il trt1der'c; fraud); KPMG, Lack of Stature and Resources for Risk 
Managem�nt Cited .,� Leadinc; Contributors lo Cred it Crisis, KPMG Study Finds, 
jan. 6, 2009, aPIIilnblt! at http:/ I W\-\'W.us.kpmg.com/RutUS_prod/ Documents/12 
I Lack_of_Si<�lurt!.pdf (reporting results of a survey among banks' risk managers 
according to which 78 percent of the respondents declare their intention to 
improve methodologies to m�asure and report risks). 
1l See, e.g., Alistair MacDonald, Brita111's FSA Begi11s lo Drop Its Light Touch, 
WALL STREET j. (European Edition), Jan. 5, 2009, at 1, 28; Una Salgol & Brooke 
Masters, FSA Code Will t\i111 to Tackle lncwtives for Risk-tnki11g, F!N. TIMES (London), 
Oct. 9, 2008, at 4 (f-SA has recently started requiring that bonus plans be linked to 
long-term results). 
t:! Sec Append b,  
n Gnttopordc;;co is defined ilS a policy relative Lon conserv<Hive policy based 
on the belief thot the st<1lus quo can best be def�nded throt1gh reforms Lhat merely 
change the surfaet' of thing�. See gmeral/y GUISEPPE 01 LAtvlrEDUSA, THE LEOPARD 
(Archibald Colquhoun trans., Pantheon Books 2007) (1958). 
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did prior to the present crisis. Therefore, as the argument would 
go, wt.:> should heavily reregulate now so c1s to have in place the 
curbs that will be needed '"'·hen the current cultural change'� 
effects arc m·er. ln other words, a cullure of frugality and risk 
control can beLl fad, vvhile rules arc here lo slay. 
The problcn1 with this reasoning is, first, that, as hinted before, 
rules we devise now may not he the ones we will need to curb the 
excesses prec eding and causing the next crisis. Further, rule� are 
not that sticky (they ar-e definite ly less sticky than hum<m greed). 
Indeed, exce�sive reregulation today is the best guar,lnteE:' of 
effective pressure towards deregulation tomorrow. 
APPEND!'\ 
Regolamento della Real Marina del Regno del le due Sicilie del1841 
Art.27. "Facite Ammuina." 
All' ordinc Facite Ammuina: tutti chilli che stanno a prora 
vann' a' poppa e chilli che stann' a poppa vann' a prora: 
chilli che stann' a dritta vann' a sinistra e chilli che slanno a 
sinistra vann' a dritta: tutti chjJJi che stanno abbascio vann' 
ncoppa e chilli che stanno ncoppa vam1' bascio passann' 
tutti p'o stesso pertuso: chi nun tiene nient' a ffa, s'aremeni 
a 'cca e a 'lla." 
Author's translation: 
Regulation of the Royal Navy of the Ki ngdom of the Two Sicilies 
(1841) 
Art. 27 ''Move noisily around" 
When ordered, move noisily around: all those standing in 
prow shall move to the stern and all those standing astern 
shall move to the prow; all those standing near the 
starboard shall move to the port and all those standing near 
the port shall move to the starboard; all those standing at 
the tree-top shall go down to the hold and all those 
standing in the hold shall climb to the lree-top; everyone 
shall pass through the same hatch. 
Those who have nothing to do: do all you can hither and 
thither! 
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